Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1113b7-8 and Free Choice by Bobzien, Susanne
Forthcoming in:  
What is up to us? Studies on Causality and Responsibility in Ancient Philosophy, 
ed. P.Destrée, R. Salles and M. Zingano. Sankt Augustin: Akademia Verlag 2014.  
 
 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1113b7-8  
and free choice 
Susanne Bobzien  
1. EN 1113
b
7-8 and its putative role as evidence for indeterminist 
free choice 
One of the various arguments proposed in favour of the claim that Aristotle 
had an indeterminist notion of free choice is based on a sentence in the first para-
graph of book 3 chapter 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Here is a much-quoted 
translation of this sentence:  
(A) (1) For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting, (2) and 
where we are able to say No we are also able to say Yes. (Arist. EN 1113b7-8, tr. Rack-
ham 1926)  
The phrases ‘we are free to’ and ‘we are able to’ both translate eph’ hêmin <estin> 
(ἐφ’ ἡμῖν <ἔστιν>).1 The fact that eph’ hêmin <estin> underlies both clauses is 
made explicit in a more recent rendering: 
(B) (1) For when acting depends on us, not acting does so too, (2) and when saying no 
does so, saying yes does too. (tr. Rowe 2002) 
The sentence translated by (A) and (B) is a central sentence of a central pas-
sage in which Aristotle is concerned with certain things that are eph’ hêmin. To see 
why this sentence is thought to support indeterminist free choice, we first need to 
see what indeterminist free choice is. Authors often do not provide a definition, but 
the following account should be sufficiently general to cover the various relevant 
views:  
An agent is undetermined, and thus free, in their choice (prohairesis), if at the moment 
of making their choice, what choice they make is not fully or sufficiently determined by 
preceding, and/or simultaneously existing, causes. At the moment of the agent’s making 
the choice, no causal factors prevent them from not making that choice.2  
-------------------------------------------- 
1 More literal common English translations of eph’ hêmin <estin> are ‘it is up to us’, ‘it is in our 
power’, ‘it lies with us’, ‘it depends on us’. Context determines what translation is most suitable. For a 
detailed discussion of Aristotle’s use of eph’ hêmin see Meyer in chapter 6 of this volume.  
2 This formulation allows for the possibility that agents are sufficient causes of their actions, but are 
themselves unpredetermined in what choice they make. Cf. e.g. Bobzien, 1998: 133-4.  
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The argument for undetermined choice is introduced or implied by several Ar-
istotle scholars. One author who recently supported his claim that for Aristotle 
choice is causally undetermined with the sentence that corresponds to (A) and (B) 
is Pierre Destrée. He argues that it is Aristotle’s view that human agents, when they 
act, could have done otherwise “in the strong sense, implying the idea of freedom 
of choice” (Destrée 2011: 289-96). He regards the sentence behind (A) as “the 
most crucial […] passage” for his case (Destrée 2011: 289).3 Here is what he says: 
The first thing to be noted is the force of the expressions ‘saying Yes’, and ‘saying No’: 
‘For when acting depends on us, not acting does so too, and when saying No does so, 
saying Yes does too’.4 It is obvious that Aristotle is here relying on a common way of 
thinking about our actions: in any case where we can say Yes, we also have the very 
possibility of saying No. In other words, we only voluntarily do something when we 
have the possibility of saying ‘No, I will not do it’. (Destrée 2011: 292) 
And a little further down: 
And since one always has the very possibility of saying either Yes, or No, it means that 
acting this or that way depends on the way one will answer in the given case. In sum, 
from the way Aristotle relies on the connection that we commonly presume between 
speaking (‘Yes’, ‘No’) and action (compliance or refusal), it seems to be beyond any 
reasonable doubt, as S. Broadie very aptly says, that Aristotle assumes that “the agent is 
at least implicitly aware of the options as options” (1991: 153)” and that, one might 
add, the agent has the real possibility, or the choice, to go for one option instead of the 
other. (Destrée 2011: 292; cf. also 294, n. 11)  
“Real possibility” is one of Destrée’s ways of expressing causal indeterminism. He 
takes the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ as practical, or action-related. He regards them as short for 
‘yes, I will do it’, ‘no, I won’t do it’. He also maintains that Aristotle assumes a 
corresponding connection between speaking and action, where ‘yes’ leads to com-
pliance, ‘no’ to refusal.  
And here is Christof Rapp, referring to the Greek underlying (A):  
eine Handlung um ihrer selbst willen wählen heisst gerade, dass wir diese Handlung 
und ihre immanenten Ziele selbst für zustimmungswürdig halten. Weil wir diese 
Zustimmung auch nicht geben könnten (III 7, 1113b7 ff.) sind wir für Handlungen, die 
wir um ihrer selbst willen wählen, voll verantwortlich. (Rapp 1995: 131)  
Another author who has connected the sentence with free choice is Sarah 
Broadie. Here is a quote from her Ethics with Aristotle on our sentence:  
At NE 1113b7-11, Aristotle speaks of ‘it depends on him’ in terms of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’, 
and says that if the ‘Yes’ depends on the agent, so does the ‘No’ and conversely.5 The 
saying of ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ is practical, in that when F depends on the agent, if F occurs it 
is because the agent said ‘Yes’ to F, or refused to say ‘No’ to it , or because he said 
‘No’ or refused to say ‘Yes’ to not-F. However, this formulation assumes that it is in-
deed open to one to say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. (Broadie 1991: 153; cf. 154, 156, 159 and n. 31)  
-------------------------------------------- 
3 In fact, Destrée says this of his text T1, which includes, in addition to (A), EN 1113b8-14. But at 
292 Destrée admits that the following two sentences are not strong evidence in favour of free choice, so 
this leaves (A), which is what he explicitly uses as evidence. 
4 This is Destrée’s version of (A).  
5 There is no phrase corresponding to “and conversely” in the Greek.  
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As for Destrée, for Broadie an agent’s saying ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ corresponds to the 
affirmation or refusal of an action and is in this sense practical. Human action 
presupposes such an act of affirmation (saying ‘Yes’) for action, an act of negation 
(saying ‘No’) for refraining. It is open to, or undetermined for, agents to affirm or 
refuse action by saying ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. And these undetermined acts of affirma-
tion or refusal cannot be prevented by force (cf. also Broadie 1991: 156). Broadie 
rightly assumes that Aristotle was – as far as his extant writings go – not aware of 
any debate that contrasts free choice with causal determinism. However, she be-
lieves that for Aristotle choice is causally undetermined and that this is supported 
by the Greek sentence underlying (A) (Broadie 1991: 158). She concludes that 
“Aristotle may […] be described as a proto-indeterminist” (Broadie 1991: 158).6  
In the same vein, Francis Sparshott writes about the passage that contains 
(A):“This is Aristotle’s essential thesis: our vices and virtues are the outcome of 
our choices, and whenever we choose to say yes we could choose to say no,” (Spar-
shott 1994: 130, about EN 1113
b
3-21) and that for Aristotle “it is still true that 
choices involve saying yes or no, that whoever says yes can say no and vice versa. 
(Sparshott 1994: 134, n. 82. Italics mine)7 
The interpretation of the sentence behind (A) and (B) as evidence for free 
choice is not a phenomenon that has its beginnings in the 1990s. Here is a para-
phrase of our passage by George Stock from 1897. Stock rewrites the Nicho-
machean Ethics as dialogue, and here he has Aristotle speak:  
But when I speak of the voluntariness of virtue or vice, you must understand me to 
mean that the virtuous or vicious man is a free agent, that there is no force acting upon 
him except what comes from his own nature, except, in fact, himself. If he knows the 
right and the wrong, it is as open to him to choose the one as the other. Where he can 
do, he can refrain from doing, and where he can say ‘no’, he can say ‘yes’. (Stock 
1897: 179. Italics mine)8 
Let this suffice as evidence that (A) and similar translations of EN 1113
b
7-8 have 
been used by Aristotle scholars to support their thesis that Aristotle propounded 
free choice or indeterminist choice. Now to get from (A) to indeterminist free 
choice one needs to supplement two interpretative steps.  
The first interpretative step is that the Yes and No are taken as practical: ‘say-
ing no’ and ‘saying yes’ are understood as shorthand for ‘saying yes to doing 
something’ and ‘saying no to doing something’, where the saying either denotes 
something like an internal soliloquy that accompanies the act of choosing; or where 
‘saying yes’ or ‘saying no’ is Aristotle’s metaphorical way of expressing ‘choosing 
-------------------------------------------- 
6 Broadie also interprets EE 1222b41 ff. in terms of agents saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’, and concludes that 
for Aristotle the agent’s ‘yes’ or ‘no’ would be contingent (ibid. 159). Cf. also Broadie’s discussion of 
the no and the yes in her introduction to Broadie/Rowe 2002: 40. 
7 The “vice versa” is Sparshott’s addition. There is no corresponding phrase in the Greek. 
8 Cf. also vol.1 of Hammerton 1936, from the summary of Aristotle’s EN V 3: “Choice is not the 
same thing as a voluntary act; nor is it desire, or emotion, or exactly ‘wish’, since we may wish for, but 
cannot make choice of, the unattainable. Nor is it deliberation – rather, it is the act of decision following 
deliberation. If man has the power to say yes, he has equally the power to say no, and is master of his 
own action.” This clearly connects the saying Yes and saying No with choice qua an act of decision. 
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not to act’ and ‘choosing to act’. This interpretation of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ as practical 
also implies that in (A)(2) two possible choices or choosings are at issue: (i) to 
choose not to act and (ii) to choose to act. Yet, the Greek of (A)(1) only has ‘to 
act’; ‘not to act’. So the expected parallel would be ‘to choose (to act)’; ‘not to 
choose (to act)’; rather than ‘to choose to act’; ‘to choose not to act’. Quite general-
ly, there is no textual evidence that Aristotle ever discusses an agent’s alternative 
options (i) to choose to do x and (ii) to choose not to do x – as opposed to (i) to 
choose to do x and (ii) not to choose to do x. The interpretation of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ as 
practical is by no means the only option. For example, as Christopher Taylor notes, 
Aristotle could instead be talking about it being up to us (eph’ hêmin) what to say: 
“Saying Yes and No may be given as another example of opposites which are 
equally up to us, just as acting and not acting are.” (Taylor 2006: 164)9  
The second interpretative step is from choice to indeterminist choice: One 
needs to interpret Aristotle’s – presumed – statement that it is up to us to choose to 
do or not to do something as implying that the choice is causally undetermined. 
Thus it must not be fully determined by the agent’s character and deliberation as 
jointly sufficient causes. But as Stephen Everson and Michael Pakaluk have inde-
pendently noted, the ‘saying yes’ and ‘saying no’ in their versions of (A), even if 
interpreted as practical (as they both do), does not entail that the choice at issue is 
causally undetermined.10 And since (A) is used by several of the above-quoted 
scholars as support for their thesis that for Aristotle choice is causally undeter-
mined, this second interpretative step to indeterminist choice cannot simply be 
assumed. It needs to be argued for.  
2. How to translate the sentence EN 1113
b
7-8 from the Greek 
Having made a big spiel about these three points regarding (A), I now abandon 
them together with (A) until further notice. Instead, I turn to the Greek lines of 
which (A) is purported to be a translation. I start by looking at these lines, in isola-
tion from their linguistic context. (C) provides the Greek:  
(C)(1) ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, (2) καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ 
ναί· 
There are no variants for our sentence in the apparatus criticus. (D) and (E) are 
two word-for-word literal (and thus somewhat unsightly) translations: 
(D)(1) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act <is up to us>, (2) and where to not 
<is up to us>, also to yes <is up to us>.11  
-------------------------------------------- 
9 Then again, Aristotle may think of saying as a kind of action (see e.g. Arist. EE 1225a27-33). Either 
way, saying and believing would come apart. For Aristotle suggests both in De Anima (427b20) and in 
the Eudemian Ethics (1226a1-3) that belief (doxa) is not up to us (eph’ hêmin). It would of course be a 
perfectly reasonable view that the two come apart in this way. 
10 See Pakaluk 2005: 144-5, Everson 1990: 90. Broadie is aware of this point, too; cf. Broadie 1991: 
156. 
11 Here and below I stick to the awkward infinitive-splitting ‘to not act’ instead of ‘not to act’ in or-
der to provide maximal structural agreement with the Greek. 
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 (E)(1) For, where (the) acting is up to us to act, also (the) not acting is up to us, (2) and 
where (the) not <is up to us>, also (the) yes <is up to us>.  
The insertions in angled brackets in (D) and (E) seem not to be questioned by 
anyone.12 So I will not argue for them. (D) and (E) differ as follows. (D) keeps the 
syntactical role of the Greek to (τὸ) the same in (1) and (2), i.e. as introducing an 
infinitival clause; in (2) these clauses would be abbreviated. (E) replicates the 
grammatical category of the Greek word to (as definite article) by adding the Eng-
lish ‘the’ in brackets. It does not imply a parallelism of infinitival clauses between 
(1) and (2). I do not see how one can retain both points in one translation, which is 
why I have opted for two. 
Now to the points that matter: (i) There is no word for ‘saying’, or for anything 
similar, in the Greek text. In any rendering that has a verb of saying, meaning, 
intending, etc., this verb is an addition by the translator. And in adding such a verb, 
translators imply that they read or interpret the passage in a particular way. This 
way is likely to be along the lines presented in the first section. (As we have seen, 
such a reading implies neither that Aristotle maintains causal indeterminism nor 
that he expresses that choices are up to us, as opposed to actions or utterances). (ii) 
There is no word for ‘no’ in the Greek text. The word that appears to have been 
translated by ‘no’ does not mean ‘no’, and in the present use it means ‘not’.  
For something like (A) to be justified as a translation of (C), we hence should 
want at least two of the following three points satisfied: 2.1. We would want some 
textual parallels, in which the Greek for ‘to not […] to yes’ has the meaning of ‘to 
say “no” […] to say “yes” ’, with a verb of saying either explicitly given or indubi-
tably understood; these passages should preferably be by Aristotle, or roughly from 
Aristotle’s time (plus/minus 500 years, say). 2.2. We would want an explanation as 
to how exactly to read (C) to mean something like (A), i.e. involving a verb of 
saying and ‘yes’ and ‘no’. 2.3. We would want there to be no reasonable alterna-
tive interpretation that avoids inserting a verb of saying and rendering mê (μή) by 
‘no’. We take these three points in turn. 
2.1. Parallel passages considered 
Our EN passage seems unique among ancient Greek texts in having to mê (τὸ 
μή) and to nai (τὸ ναί) directly opposed to each other, functioning as part of an 
abbreviation for something (if unclear so far for what). A fortiori, there seem to be 
no parallels in which the Greek for ‘to not […] to yes’ has the meaning of ‘to say 
“no” […] to say “yes” ’, with a verb of saying either explicitly given or indubitably 
understood. Or in any event nobody has put one forward yet. The closest passages 
in Aristotle’s oeuvre are presumably the following six:  
 
-------------------------------------------- 
12 A more literal translation of en hois (ἐν οἷς) would be ‘in those <cases/circumstances/situations> 
in which’. As this point is irrelevant to my purpose, I have opted for the shorter ‘where’. In principle, en 
ois could also refer to people as third person masculine plural. However, it is unclear what the relevance 
of acting ‘among people’ rather than ‘in cases/circumstances/situations’ could be.  
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 A dialectical proposition must be such that one can answer it with yes or no. 
(Top.158
a
15-17)  
 But if the question is clear and simple, he should answer either yes or no. 
(Top.160
a
33-4)  
 The person questioned should answer either yes or no. (Soph.Elen.175b9-10)  
 The answerer must say either yes or no. (Soph.Elen.175b13-14)  
 It is possible […] for it to be true to say either yes or no. (Soph.Elen.176a10-
11)  
 […] he should not say (the) yes or no in the case of homonyms. 
(Soph.Elen.176
a
15-16)13  
 
What makes these passages at least worth contemplating is that they each have 
a Greek verb of saying (‘to say’ and ‘to answer’) combined with the standard 
Greek words for ‘yes’ and ‘no’. However, the passages are not close enough to 
provide support for the reading of our Greek sentence (C) as (A). First, they are all 
in the context of Aristotle’s dialectic. Saying or answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ was part of 
the dialectical game or method, as is well established (Whittaker 1996: 101). There 
are no comparable passages in Aristotle in contexts of human agency where the 
agent says ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as a way of making a choice (deciding, agreeing, telling 
themselves) to do or not to do something.  
The passages from Aristotle’s dialectic fail as parallels for two further reasons. 
None of them has a definite article (to) in front of the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’, as (C) 
has; and all have ou (οὔ), the Greek word used equally for ‘not’ and for ‘no’, not 
mê. But (C) has mê. And mê is a word used adverbially for ‘not’ in certain gram-
matical contexts – but not for ‘no’.14 So the six passages are not parallel passages. 
Nor are there any other parallels in the Corpus Aristotelicum (or in any of the an-
cient Greek texts in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae) which have to mê and to nai 
opposed in a sentence or sequence of sentences. By contrast, there are quite a few 
passages that oppose to nai and to ou.  
Christopher Taylor, one of the very few philosophers who attempt to explain 
the – presumed – ‘saying’ in (A), suggests a possible parallel in Aristotle’s Ethics. 
He writes:  
It is […] possible that Aristotle is thinking of acting as itself a way of giving an af-
firmative answer to the question ‘Should I Φ?’ and not acting as a way of giving a 
negative answer to that question. Cf. <EN> VI.2, 1139a21-2, ‘what assertion and denial 
are in thought, pursuit and avoidance are in desire’, which seems to mean that pursuing 
some end is itself a way of asserting that the thing is to be pursued (or that it is good) 
-------------------------------------------- 
13 ἔστι γὰρ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ πρὸς ἣν ἔστιν ἀποκρίνασθαι ναί ἢ οὔ (Top.158a15-17). ἐὰν δὲ καὶ 
σαφὲς ᾖ καὶ ἁπλοῦν τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἢ ναί ἢ οὔ ἀποκριτέον (Top.160a 33-4). τὸ ἢ ναί ἢ οὔ 
ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸν ἐρωτώμενον (Soph.Elen.175b9-10). ἢ ναί ἢ οὔ ἀνάγκη λέγειν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον 
(Soph.Elen.175b13-14). ἐγχωρεῖ […] ἢ ναί ἢ οὔ ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέγειν. (Soph.Elen.176a10-11). οὐδ’ ἐπὶ 
τῶν ὁμωνύμων τὸ ναί ἢ οὔ λεκτέον (Soph.Elen.176a15-16 – several manuscripts do not have the τὸ; 
some have ἢ before τὸ).  
14 The grammatical contexts in which μή is used adverbially for ‘not’ are typically one of the follow-
ing: with the imperative; with the subjunctive; with the optative; with the infinitive; and with participles 
when they have a conditional or general force; and in certain indirect questions.  
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and avoiding something a way of denying that it is to be pursued (or that it is good). 
(Taylor 2006: 164)  
This attempt is however unsuccessful. The passage Taylor quotes does not “seem 
to mean” what he suggests. If a and b are in thought what c and d are in desire, it is 
neither implied nor indicated that c-ing and d-ing are ways of a-ing and b-ing. For 
illustration: if I say that truth is in thought what the good is in desire, it does not 
follow that the good is a kind of truth. Rather, the case suggests that there is some-
thing that a and c, and b and d, respectively, share. 
Putting this point aside, the Aristotle passage also does not support the view 
that choice is at issue in (A) and (C). Rather, if we take Taylor at his word, what 
Aristotle seems to intend to say is:  
(F)(1) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act <is up to us>, (2) and where to not 
act <is up to us>, also to act <is up to us>.  
In (F)(2) action, not choice, is the subject under discussion. We will see below that 
to obtain (F) no verb of saying needs to be invoked. The problematic translation 
(A) would thus be unnecessary. 
2.2. ‘Not’ and ‘Yes’ as ‘Don’t’ and ‘Do’  
Can one provide a plausible justification for the insertion of a verb of saying 
and the translation of mê as no? None of the scholars proposing (A) seem to have 
provided one. Here is one suggestion as to what they could have provided. 
First, there is the fact that the ancients had no quotation marks, and that the 
definite article to was frequently used in a way similar to quotation marks in Eng-
lish, to indicate that an expression or sentence is mentioned, not used. This fact 
could be exploited to justify the translation ‘the “not”’ and ‘the “yes”’. Second, 
perhaps Aristotle’s use of mê in (C) is not meant to be equivalent to “ou”, meaning 
“no”, as used in answers to questions. Rather, mê may be employed by Aristotle 
the way it is used in independent clauses that express a negative command, as in 
mê praxês, ‘don’t act!’: a person deliberates whether to do something; it is up to 
them to choose not to do it; in this case, their choosing involves their telling them-
selves ‘don’t act!’.  
In support of this reading, reference could be made to Aristotle’s sporadic allu-
sions to the use of syllogisms in practical reasoning in the Ethics. An example 
would be EN 1147
a34, of a universal premise, ‘it says to avoid this’. Another pas-
sage one might adduce is EN 1143
a
8-9, ‘For practical wisdom gives commands. 
For what one must do or not <do> is its end.’ Moreover, it could be adduced that 
Plato takes thinking to be internal speech; and that a century after Aristotle, the 
Stoic Chrysippus had a theory that, in rational beings, the impulse to act takes the 
form of the agent’s reason proscribing or commanding the agent to act (Plutarch 
Stoic.Rep.1037F). One could imagine this to take the following form: Zoe to her-
self ‘Don’t eat the baklava!’or Zoe to herself ‘(Do) eat the baklava!’. Thus we 
would get a reading of the kind:  
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(G)(1) ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, (2) καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ 
<πράξῃς> καὶ τὸ <πρᾶξον>,  
in translation:  
(H)(1) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act <is up to us>, (2) and where the 
‘don’t <act!’ is up to us>, also the ‘do <act!’ is up to us>.  
This seems to go some way toward explaining the to mê (as opposed to to ou) in 
conjunction with an implicit verb of saying.15 Still, such imperative understanding 
of to mê poses its own difficulties. 
 
 The understanding of the definite article τὸ in lieu of quotation marks oblite-
rates the – expected – parallel between the two uses of τὸ in (1) and the two 
uses in (2).  
 The mê is no longer on a par with the ‘nai’. In particular, grammatically nai is 
not part of positive commands, and cannot be short for ‘do act!’.  
 Moreover, with this reading one would still expect the sequence positive–
negative in both (1) and (2), now taking the form ‘do!’ – ‘don’t!’ in (2). In-
stead we have ‘don’t!’ –‘do!’. 
 And last but not least, we would need some supporting evidence in Aristotle’s 
text for the assumption that to mê in the middle of (C) can be short for our 
telling ourselves ‘don’t act!’. Some hints at practical reasoning in other books 
of the Nicomachean Ethics are not sufficient;16 nor are references to Plato’s 
internal speech and Stoic impulses. We would need evidence that in Aristotle 
to mê can be a reference to a self-addressed imperative, evidence which I be-
lieve we do not have.  
 
So (G) is not a viable option. (Nor, of course, would (A) be a translation of (C) 
understood as (G).)  
Thus, as far as I can see, there is no legitimate way of getting a translation like 
(A) from (C). One would need even better reasons to subsequently interpret (A), or 
similar, as meaning that it is up to an agent to choose not to act or to choose to act. 
The following two reasons would not be good reasons for such an interpretation. (i) 
Aristotle had a theory of free choice which involved some kind of internal mono-
logue of choosing. This reason is not good, since (C) is used as part of the main 
evidence for just this claim. The reasoning would be circular. (ii): We would natu-
rally or intuitively think that Aristotle wants to say what the translation provides 
(cf. e.g. Destrée 2011: 288). This reason is not good, since we cannot infer from 
what we – or some of us – naturally or intuitively think today that the ancients 
thought this, too. If this were a methodologically sound step, it would become 
-------------------------------------------- 
15 I have not found this reading of (C) explicitly defended anywhere, but would be surprised if I was 
the first to consider this option. Perhaps Taylor 2006: 164 (quoted above) had something similar in 
mind. 
16 Also, the above-quoted passage EN 1143a8-9 is about practical wisdom (phronesis). But in Aristo-
tle’s view, not everyone has practical wisdom; whereas (C), i.e. EN 1113b7-8, is about all adult human 
beings. So the relevance of EN 1143a8-9 is doubtful. 
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impossible to show the absence in antiquity of certain thoughts that are common in 
present thinking.  
2.3. Alternative ways to translate and understand the sentence as an 
abbreviation  
No doubt, (C) does involve some abbreviation, ellipsis, contraction, and there 
is no straightforward easy reading. Still disregarding its textual context, I next ask: 
how else could one complete the elliptical clause (C)(2)? First I look at to mê; then 
at to nai.  
There is a natural and simple way of supplementing to mê. This is by supple-
menting the infinitive ‘to act’ (prattein) and reading to mê as short for ‘to not act is 
up to us’ (to mê prattein eph’ hêmin). 
(I)(1) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act <is up to us>, (2) and where to not 
<act is up to us>, also […].  
There are quite a few examples in Aristotle in which mê is short for mê prat-
tein (or a similar verb of doing or happening); several are in the context of what is 
eph’ hêmin. In all cases, just beforehand in the sentence we find πράττειν (or that 
other verb of doing or happening).17 (I)(2) unquestionably provides the most natu-
ral way of supplementing to mê in the context of the whole sentence (C). So it is a 
good starting point. What are we then to do with to nai? to nai does not square 
straightforwardly with to mê, no matter what. Any interpreter is saddled with this 
problem. Still, if (I) provides the correct supplementation after to mê, it is clear 
what to nai is intended to convey: the alternative ‘to act’. So, assuming (I) to be 
correct, we get:  
(J)(1) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act <is up to us>, (2) and where to not 
<act is up to us>, also to <act is up to us>.  
In other words, ‘to yes’ is short for ‘to act is up to us’ (to prattein eph’ hêmin), 
as contrasted with ‘to not act is up to us’; i.e. with emphasis on ‘act’. (J) is indeed 
the way countless translators and scholars across the ages have read (C). Some-
times, (C)(2) is simply rendered by ‘and vice versa’. This may be to evade the 
awkwardness of the to nai; or to reflect the extreme brevity of (C)(2). (Hencefor-
ward, I call all translations of type (J) vice-versa translations.)18 
Can to nai be read as an abbreviation of ‘to act <is up to us>’ – as contrasted 
with to not act? Grammatically, this amounts to having to show that the Greek 
word for ‘yes’ in a phrase ‘to yes’ can be an abbreviation for an emphatic ‘to Φ’, 
contrasted with ‘to not Φ’ (where Φ stands for a verb of action).  
Can this be shown? Not by ancient Greek parallels. But perhaps a case can be 
made by comparison with other languages, together with what we know about the 
-------------------------------------------- 
17 E.g. EN 1110a17-8; EN 1143a8-9; EE 1223a5-8; cf. also Met. 1042b7-8; Rhet. 1359a36 and 
Athen.Const. 43 section 5.  
18 Vice-versa translations can be found e.g. in Gauthier/Jolif 1970 vol. I: 68 (“et réciproquement”), 
Wardman 1963: 359; Apostle/Gerson 1983: 459; and also in some scholarly books and articles, e.g. 
Hardie 1980: 178. 
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use of nai. The English ‘yes’ can – informally – stand in for what is expressed by 
the emphatic ‘doch’ in German. Take this dialogue: ‘this is green’ – ‘(no,) it isn’t’ 
– ‘(yes,) it is’ – ‘no’ – ‘yes’; or its variation: ‘this is green’ – ‘(no,) it isn’t’ – ‘(yes,) 
it is’ – ‘is not’ – ‘is too’ (or ‘is so’). Similarly, the Latin etiam does not only mean 
‘yes’, but also ‘also’, ‘again’. I wonder whether something similar may not hold of 
the ancient Greek nai.  
Take the following German translation of (C) in the spirit of the vice versa 
translations. (Double angled brackets are used to indicate what would be under-
stood, but need not be supplemented in the translation):  
(K)(1) Denn wenn es bei uns liegt zu handeln, <liegt es> auch <bei uns> nicht zu 
handeln, (2) und wenn <<es bei uns liegt>> nicht <<zu handeln>>, dann auch doch 
<<zu handeln>>  
In English, a crude (and not-quite-right) equivalent would be: 
(L)(1) For, where acting is up to us, also not acting <is up to us>, (2) and where not 
<<acting>>, also <<acting>> too. 
The German at least seems grammatically just fine. Until proven otherwise, I 
assume that the analogue in Greek for (K) (with nai for the German ‘doch’) is fine, 
too.19 And, accordingly, the English vice-versa translation (J). In that case, we have 
a reading of (C) which is superior to all others in that it makes full sense of the text 
as it stands.20  
Even if this reading were not fully grammatical, (J) would still be vastly pref-
erable to (A). For none of the alternatives, including (A), make (C) fully grammat-
ical. In addition, unlike (A), (J) (i) does not require the supplementation of a verb 
of saying; (ii) reads mê correctly as ‘not’; and (iii) requires no complex not-quite-
fitting interpretation.21  
 Based on reading (J), we can also explain what Aristotle’s point of stating (C) 
is. It is to make explicit an important element of the logical structure of the notion 
of something’s being up to someone (epi (ἐπὶ) + dative), an element which Aristo-
-------------------------------------------- 
19 We find such use of nai for example several times in the work of the 9th century grammarian Geor-
gius Choeroboscus, where he is talking about the conjugation of verbs (his views have survived in notes 
taken by his pupils): ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ α χαρακτηριστικὸν τῶν τρίτων προσώπων τῶν ἑνικῶν· τὸ δὲ ε 
ναί, οἷον ἔτυπτε (30) ἔλεγε· (Georgius Choeroboscus, Prolegomena et scholia in Theodosii Alexandrini 
canones isagogicos de flexione verborum 86.29-31; cf. ibid. 85.17-18; 86.34-5; 336.25-6) Here the ναί 
is short for ἔστι χαρακτηριστικὸν τῶν τρίτων προσώπων τῶν ἑνικῶν, which is contrasted with the 
previous clause, which negates the same predicate phrase; just as the ναί in (C) does in the vice-versa 
reading (J). Further parallel passages are Eustratius of Nicaea, Orationes (ed. Demetrakopoulos), 
Oration 3, 86.23-6 and Manuel II Palaeologus, Dialogi cum mahometano (ed. Migne), Dialogue 17, 
221.29-31. 
20 The reading (J)(K)(L) differs from the don’t/do reading (G)(H). In (J)(K)(L) the ναί stands in as an 
abbreviation for a phrase that occurred in the exact same form earlier in the same sentence (i.e. 
πράττειν). In the case of the don’t/do reading (G)(H) this is not so. 
21 Moreover, (iv), (J) makes perfect sense of the order affirmative/negative – negative/affirmative in 
the sequence of the two conditionals (C)(1) and (C)(2). If instead (C)(2) also had the order affirma-
tive/negative, this would simply be a repeat of (C)(1). It is thus ruled out. The interpretations behind (A) 
do not explain the inverted order. Proponents of (A) could try and plead the rhetorical device of chias-
mus, though it would be a rather unusual case. 
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tle indicates in at least ten other places: This is its two-sidedness.22 Aristotle never 
provides a philosophical account of what it is for something to be eph’ hêmin (as 
he does of the voluntary, deliberation, choice, virtue, etc.). He uses eph’ hêmin and 
other epi + dative personal pronoun constructions as expressions of ordinary lan-
guage which are generally understood by speakers of the language. In reading (J), 
sentence (C) makes explicit something people who speak the language assume: 
that doing something is up to us if and only if not doing it is up to us, too. To ex-
press this biconditional, both (C)(1) and (C)(2) are required.  
Why does Aristotle state this biconditional at the beginning of EN III 5, 
though? The reason is this: he needs to make explicit the logical structure of the 
notion of eph’ hêmin at this point, since he exploits it as part of the argument EN 
1113
b
6-14.23 That is, the biconditional is needed for the context of (C).  
3. The linguistic context of (C) taken into account  
Hence, next I consider how readings (A) and (J) of the Greek sentence (C) fare, when one 
takes the immediate linguistic context into account.24 First note the following three points: 
(i) The sentence before (C) is  
  (M) Now, virtue is up to us, too, and equally also vice.25 (EN 1113b6-7) 
(ii) The argument ends with the conclusion (marked by the particle ἄρα)  
 (N)    so it will be up to us to be virtuous people and to be vicious people.26 (EN 
1113b13-14)  
This final clause of the argument states almost the same thing as (M). (iii) Our 
sentence (C) immediately follows (M) and begins with ‘for’ (gar). It thus provides 
a reason for (M).  
 Combining (i) to (iii) with what we know about Aristotle’s dialectic, we get 
the following set-up of an argument from (M) to (N), or from 1113b6 to b14: Aris-
totle provides the thesis he intends to prove in (M) at the beginning of his argu-
ment. This is standard in Aristotelian dialectic. He then argues for (M) up until and 
including the antecedent of the sentence 1113b11-14. The consequent of the sen-
tence is (N). It provides the conclusion of his argument. Thus from (C) to (N) (i.e. 
from 1113b7-8 to b13-14) Aristotle provides an argument for the thesis that (not 
-------------------------------------------- 
22 EE 1123a6, 7-8, 1223a5-6, 1225a9-10, 1225b35-6, 1226a27-8, 1226b30-1; EN III 1, 1110a17-8; EN 
III 5, 1115a2-3, 1125a26; cf. Bobzien 1998: 143-5, also 139-40.  
23 At EN 1113b14, Aristotle moves on to consider a possible objection. 
24 Here I ignore the debate whether (i) the whole paragraph 1113b6-14 is meant to show that vice is 
up to us, with Aristotle taking it to have been shown already that virtue is up to us (the asymmetry 
reading); or whether (ii) the whole paragraph is meant to show that both virtue and vice (acting virtu-
ously and acting viciously) are up to us. For the question whether EN 1113b7-8 supports undetermined 
choice in Aristotle, this debate is only of minor importance. (Cf. also the next footnote.) 
25 ἐφ’ ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. In all MSS that are considered in the Oxford edi-
tion the sentence does not have the particle δή (‘hence’, ‘now’), but the particle δέ. Modern editions of 
the EN tend to print δὴ. The emendation may be unnecessary, since Aristotle uses the combination of 
the particle combination δέ καὶ […] δέ […] elsewhere in the EN in one sentence – cf. e.g EN 1103a8-10.  
26 ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. 
12 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1113
b
7-8 and free choice 
just actions but also) virtue and vice are up to us. This is so regardless of what 
exactly the thesis (M) and the conclusion (N) amount too. (C) is a premise in this 
argument.  
With the sentence following (C), Aristotle argues towards an intermediate 
conclusion: it starts with hôst’ (ὥστ’), which in grammatical contexts such as ours 
translates most naturally as ‘hence’:  
(O) Hence, (1) if to act, being noble, is up to us, also to not act, being shameful, will be 
up to us, and (2) if to not act, being noble, is up to us, also to act, being shameful, <will 
be> up to us. (EN 1113b8-11) 
 (C) and (O) are strikingly parallel. This can be made explicit by using col-
umns. I provide first the Greek, then the translation. The first column presents EN 
1113
b
7-8, divided into four phrases, one per line; the second does the same with 
EN 1113
b
8-11. Bold indicates complete textual agreement between the two sen-
tences. Underlining indicates phrases that are explicit in (O) and for which, regard-
ing (C), it is not debated that they are understood at the parallel places.  
 
Column I (EN 1113
b
7-8)             Column II (EN 1113
b
8-11) 
 
For, where it is up to us to act Hence if to act, being noble, is up to us 
also to not act < is up to us > also to not act, being shameful, is up to us,  
and where to not < is up to us > and if to not act, being noble, is up to us  
also to yes < is up to us >   also to act, being shameful, is up to us  
 
ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν ὥστ’ εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστί, 
καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν < ἐφ’ ἡμῖν > καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, 
καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή < ἐφ’ ἡμῖν > καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν,  
καὶ τὸ ναί < ἐφ’ ἡμῖν > καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. 
 
This striking parallel provides a strong reason for reading (C)(2) as an abbre-
viation along the lines which I – in agreement with numerous other scholars – have 
suggested; that is, as short for:  
(C)(2) καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ <πράττειν ἐφ’ἡμῖν ἐστί> καὶ τὸ <πράττειν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστί> 
(J)(2) and where to not <act is up to us>, also to <act is up to us>.  
This reading provides four perfectly matching cases, in the right order. The only 
substantive difference is that in (M) each time an evaluative attribute is added.27 
The apparent lack of parallelism in (C), from positive/negative in (1) to nega-
tive/positive in (2) finds a full explanation in the move from noble to shameful in 
the two conditionals of (J). Aristotle’s intent is to cover all four possibilities and 
their interrelations (noble action is paired with shameful inaction; noble inaction 
with shameful action), and for each interrelation he starts with the noble case.  
The parallel between (C) and (O) also provides strong reasons for not adding a 
verb of saying as readings of type (A) do. First, with (A), the inferential ‘hence’ 
(hôst’) is very hard to explain. Second, no mention is made of saying yes or no, or 
the like, ever again in the argument at issue. But if (A) were correct, we would 
-------------------------------------------- 
27 For the purpose of this addition at this point in book 5 of the EN see Bobzien (forthcoming). 
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expect some such mention, given the parallel structure of (O) and (C). We can be 
more precise: if (A) were correct we would expect the second half of (O) to be 
something like (P)(2):  
(P)(2) and if saying yes, being noble, is up to us, also saying no, being shameful, is up 
to us.  
But we do not have this. Rather, if (A) were correct, (O)(2) would just hang in 
the air, sotospeak. There is nothing in the previous sentence for it to latch onto. 
Even without the linguistic context taken into account, (A) turned out to be a 
doubtful translation of (C). Now, with the context considered in addition, it be-
comes clear that translations like (A) misrepresent the Aristotelian text.28  
4. Concluding remarks 
Where does all this leave us regarding the question of free choice in Aristotle? 
We have seen that there is a flourishing tradition among Aristotle scholars of read-
ing sentence (C)(2) as an abbreviation for ‘if saying No is up to us, saying Yes is 
also up to us’ (i.e. as (A)(2)); and thus of reading it as containing an implicit verb 
of saying, and of translating the mê in (C)(2) by ‘no’;29 further of understanding the 
sentence, thus translated, as being about practical assent or denial; and as express-
ing free choice or causally undetermined choice.  
I noted that, even if the reading of (C) as (A) were correct, there would be no 
compelling reasons to understand the sentence as being about practical assent and 
denial, or to understand it as expressing free choice, and a fortiori not as express-
ing causally undetermined choice; moreover, that the proponents of (A) face the 
difficulty of explaining the lack of parallelism in (A)(1) and (A)(2). Next I argued 
that (A) is in fact not an acceptable translation of (C). To this end, I showed that 
there are no parallels in Aristotle, or in antiquity generally, that would support 
readings like (A); I noted moreover, that the Greek seems not to lend itself to such 
a translation; and finally, that there is a simple, most reasonable, alternative trans-
lation (i.e. the vice-versa reading (J)), that is not fraught with any of the difficulties 
(A) faces, and for which there are partial parallels in Aristotle and other Greek 
texts. Finally, I demonstrated that the linguistic context of (C) strongly supports 
reading (J), and by contrast does not tally with (A).  
A question that remains to be addressed is whether vice-versa readings like (J) in 
any way support the proposition that Aristotle, in EN III 5, advocates free or inde-
terminist choice. Here (J) is again: 
(J)(1) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act <is up to us>, (2) and where to not 
<act is up to us>, also to <act is up to us>.  
-------------------------------------------- 
28 For a comprehensive study of the reception of (C) from antiquity to the present day and a historical 
explanation of the frequency of translations of type (A) cf. Bobzien 2013. 
29 In addition to the authors and passages mentioned in Section 1 above (Rackham 1926, Broadie 
1991, Sparshott 1994, Destrée 2011, Rapp 1995, Stock 1897, Taylor 2006, Everson 1990, Pakaluk 
2005), saying-yes-saying-no renderings are also found in the translations of Stahr 1863: 86, Williams 
1869: 64, Peters 1881, Oswald 1962: 65, Crisp 2000: 45, Rowe 2002: 130, Taylor 2006: 24. 
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First and without doubt, (J)(1) and (J)(2) are both about acting and refraining 
from acting. Choice is neither expressly mentioned nor in any way implied as topic 
of the sentence. Second, the sentence states nothing that had not been stated earlier 
in EN III 1-4. Its purpose in EN III 5 is to provide a premise for an argument that 
concludes that being virtuous and being vicious are both up to us. Third, the fact 
that Aristotle states that both acting and refraining from acting are up to us does 
not imply that we are causally undetermined with regard to whether we act. The 
phrase eph’ hêmin may simply be used to indicate that there is an absence of exter-
nal force (in the form of something external either making us move or preventing 
us from moving); and that, given that this condition is satisfied, it depends on us, in 
the sense of on who we are at the point of deliberating and choosing, whether we 
act or refrain from acting in the particular circumstances of action at issue.30  
From all this it follows that (C), i.e. EN 1113
b
7-8, is not a text that supports an 
interpretation of Aristotle as a proponent of indeterminist free choice or free will. 
That is, the sentence that is sometimes adduced as the main piece of evidence for 
the claim that Aristotle was an indeterminist with respect to choosing (prohairesis) 
and acting (praxeis, prattein), is no evidence for this claim at all.31 
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